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HISTORY
My interest in psychometrics began during my undergraduate years at Stanford
University, where I was fortunate to be exposed to stimulating courses in psychological
measurement and personality assessment taught by Quinn McNemar and Lewis Goldberg.
My interest in risk occurred "by chance," when I was assigned to be a research assistant to
Clyde Coombs during my first year as a graduate student in psychology at the University of
Michigan. I was fascinated by a study Coombs was doing in which he examined people's
preferences among gambles. I replicated and extended this study as a first year project.
The following year I began towork with Ward Edwards, who was doing experimental studies
of risk-taking and decision making. In Edward's laboratory I met Sarah Lichtenstein and
Amos Tversky, who were also students ofEdwards. Lichtenstein, Edwards, and I teamed
up in a study of boredom induced changes in preference among bets (Slovic, Lichtenstein,
&Edwards, 1965). Lichtenstein and I went our separate ways butwere reunited inEugene,
Oregon in 1966, and have worked together since then.
In about 1975, Lichtenstein, Baruch Fischhoff, and I began a research program
designed to study what we referred to as "cognitive processes and societal risk taking"
(Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1976). This initiative was a natural evolution of the
laboratory studies on decision making under risk that Lichtenstein and I had been doing
since 1960. In 1970, we were introduced to Gilbert White, who asked ifourresearch could
provide insight into some of the puzzling behaviors he had observed in the domain of
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human response to natural hazards. Much to our embarrassment, we realized that our
laboratory studies had been too narrowly focused on choices among simple gambles to tell
us much about risk-taking behavior outside the laboratory.
White's questions were intriguing and, with Howard Kunreuther, we turned our
attention to natural hazards, attempting to relate behavior on flood plains and earthquake
faults to principles that had been emerging from psychological studies of probabilistic
judgments and risky choice (Slovic, Kunreuther, &White, 1974). We found the work that
Amos Tversky and Danny Kahneman had been doing on heuristics and biases in
probabilistic thinking (Tversky &Kahneman, 1974) to be particularly valuable in explaining
people's responses to the threats posed by natural hazards. The mid-1970s were a time in
which concerns about pesticides and nuclear power were rapidly increasing and we soon
found our attention drawn to technological hazards. Discovery of Chauncey Starr's
stimulating article on "Social Benefit and Technological Risk" (Starr, 1969) set us on a
course that my colleagues and I continue to explore today.
The Psychometric Paradigm and its Origins
Starr's paper sought to develop a method for weighing technological risks against
benefits to answer the fundamental question "How safe is safe enough?" His revealed
preference approach assumed that, by trial and error, society arrives at an essentiaUy
optimum balance between the risks and benefits associated with any activity. Under this
assumption, one may use historical or current risk and benefit data to reveal patterns of
"acceptable" risk/benefit tradeoffs. Examining such data for eight industries and activities,
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Starr concluded that (a) acceptability of risk from an activity is roughly proportional to the
third power ofthe benefits from that activity; (b) the public will accept risks from voluntary
activities (such as skiing) that are roughly 1000 times as great as it would tolerate from
involuntary activities (such as food preservatives) that provide the same level ofbenefits;
and (c) the acceptable level of risk is inversely related to the number ofpersons exposed
to the risk.
The merits and deficiencies of Starr's revealedpreference approach havebeen debat
edat length (see, e.g., Fischhoff, Slovic, &Lichtenstein, 1979; Otway &Cohen, 1975). We
were particularly concerned about its assumptions. It is politically conservative in that it
enshrines current economic and social arrangements, assuming that accepted risks are
acceptable risks. It ignores distributional questions (who assumes what risks and who gets
what benefits). It makes strong assumptions about the rationality of people's decision
making inthe marketplace and about the freedom ofchoice that the marketplace provides.
It assumes not only that people have full information but also that they can use that infor
mation optimally. Finally, from a technical standpoint, it is no simple matter to develop the
measures of risks and benefits needed for the implementation of this approach.
Concerns about these assumptions and the difficulties of data collection motivated
us to conduct an analogous study using questionnaires to ask people directly about their
perceptions1 of risks and benefits and their expressed preferences for various kinds of
1The word perception is used here and in the literature to refer to various kinds of
attitudes and judgments.
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risk/benefit tradeoffs. This approach appealed to us for several reasons: it elicits current
preferences; it allows consideration ofmany aspects ofrisks and benefit besides dollars and
body counts; and it permits data to be gathered for large numbers ofactivities and technol
ogies, allowing the use of statistical methods to disentangle multiple influences on the
results. Over the years, many studies of risk perception have been carried out using this
approach (Slovic, 1987).
In our replication of Starr's study, and in much of our subsequent work, we went
beyond merely asking about risk and benefit. Borrowing from personality theory, we also
asked people to characterize the "personality ofhazards" by rating them on various qualities
orcharacteristics (e.g., voluntariness, catastrophic potential, controllability, dread) that had
been hypothesized to influence risk perception and acceptance (Starr, 1969; Lowrance,
1976).
Another distinguishing feature ofour studies has been the use ofa variety ofpsycho
metric scaling methods toproduce quantitative measures ofperceived risk, perceived benefit,
and other aspects ofperceptions (e.g., estimated fatalities resulting from an activity). First
we used magnitude estimation techniques (Stevens, 1958) to assess risks and benefits and
perceived frequencies offatal events (Fischhoff etal., 1978; Lichtenstein et al., 1978). Later
we moved to numerical rating scales. In subsequent studies, we have supplemented these
measures with traditional attitude questions and non-traditional word association and
scenario generation methods. We have referred to this general approach and the theoretical
framework in which it is embedded as the psychometric paradigm.
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Of course, the psychometric paradigm, with its elicitation of perceptions and
expressed preferences has its own assumptions and limitations. It assumes people can
provide meaningful answers to difficult, if not impossible questions ("What is the risk of
death in the United States from nuclear power?"). The results are dependentupon the set
ofhazards studied, thequestions asked about these hazards, thetypes ofpersons questioned,
and the data analysis methods. The questions typically assess cognitions~not actual
behavior. Despite these and other limitations, the studies using this approach have
invariably produced coherent and interesting results that have motivated further use ofthe
paradigm.
One ofthe most important assumptions inourapproach is that risk is inherently sub
jective. Risk does not exist "out there," independent ofour minds and cultures, waiting to
be measured. Human beings have invented the concept risk to help them understand and
cope with the dangers and uncertainties of life. There is no such thing as "real risk" or
"objective risk." The nuclear engineer's probabilistic risk estimate for a reactor accident or
the toxicologist's quantitative estimate of a chemical's carcinogenic risk are both based on
theoretical models, whose structure is subjective and assumption laden, and whose inputs
are dependent upon judgment. Non-scientists have their own models, assumptions, and
subjective assessment techniques (intuitive risk assessments), which are sometimes very
different from the scientist's methods. It was no accident that our studies asking people
(and experts) to judge risk left risk undefined. This was done to allow the inherent
subjectivity of risk to be expressed.
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In sum, the psychometric paradigm encompasses a theoretical framework that
assumes risk is subjectively defined by individuals who may be influenced by a wide array
of psychological, social, institutional, and cultural factors. The paradigm assumes that, with
appropriate design of survey instruments, many of these factors and their interrelationships
can be quantified and modeled in order to illuminate the responses ofindividuals and their
societies to the hazards that confront them.
EARLY RESULTS
The early results from psychometric studies ofperceived risk have been reviewed by
Slovic (1987) and will be referred to only briefly in this section.
One ofthe most exciting findings, to those ofus who drafted the first questionnaires
(and who realized their difficulty), was that people could, and would, answer them, making
hundreds of judgments per person in sessions lasting up to several hours. Equally surprising
to us was that the results seemed to make sense and provide insight into many of the
puzzling phenomenon evident in societal risk management and its controversies. Perceived
and acceptable risk appeared systematic and predictable. Psychometric techniques seemed
well-suited for identifying similarities and differences among groups with regard to risk
perceptions and attitudes. Our results also showed that the concept "risk" meant different
things to different people. When experts judged risk, their responses correlated highly with
technical estimates of annual fatalities. Lay people could assess annual fatalities if they
were asked to (and they produced estimates somewhat like the technical estimates).
However, their judgments of "risk" were sensitive to other factors as well (e.g., catastrophic
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potential, controllability, threat to future generations) and, as a result, differed considerably
from their own (and experts') estimates of annual fatalities.
Another consistent result from psychometric studies ofexpressed preferences was that
people tended to view current risk levels as unacceptably high for most activities. The gap
between perceived and desired risk levels suggested that, contrary to the assumptions ofthe
revealed preference approach, our respondents were not satisfied with the way that market
and other regulatory mechanisms had balanced risks and benefits. Across the domain of
hazards, there seemed to be little systematic relationship between perceptions of current
risks and benefits. However, studies of expressed preferences did seem to support Starr's
conclusion that people are willing to tolerate higher risks from activities seen as highly
beneficial. But, whereas Starr concluded that voluntariness of exposure was the key
mediator of risk acceptance, studies of expressed preference have shown that other
characteristics, such as familiarity, control, catastrophic potential, equity, and level of
knowledge, also seem to influence the relationship between perceived risk, perceived
benefit, and risk acceptance.
Various models have been advanced to represent the relationships between percep
tions, behavior, and these qualitative characteristics ofhazards. As we shall see, the picture
that emerges from this work is both orderly and complex.
Factor-Analvtic Representations
The "personality profiles" that emerged from psychometric studies showed that every
hazard had a unique pattern of qualities that appeared to be related to its perceived risk.
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Figure 1shows the mean profiles that emerged for nuclear power and medical x-rays in one
ofour early studies (Fischhoff et al., 1978). Nuclear power was judged tohave much higher
risk than x-rays and to need much greater reduction in risk before it would become "safe
enough." As the figure illustrates, nuclear power also had a much more negative profile
across the various risk characteristics.
Insert Figure 1 about here
We observed thatmany ofthequalitative risk characteristics thatmade upa hazard's
profile were highly correlated with each other, across awide range ofhazards. For example,
hazards rated as "voluntary" tended also to be rated as "controllable" and "well-known";
hazards that appeared to threaten future generations tended also to be seen as having
catastrophic potential, and so on. Investigation of these interrelationships by means of
factor analysis indicated that the broader domain ofcharacteristics could be condensed to
a small set of higher-order characteristics or factors. Figure 2 presents a spatial representa
tion of hazards within a factor space derived from more than 40,000 individual ratings (34
respondents x 81 hazards x 15 characteristics per hazard).
Insert Figure 2 about here
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The factor space presented in Figure 2 has been replicated across numerous groups
of laypeople and experts judging large and diverse sets of hazards.2 The factors in this
space reflect the degree to which a risk is understood and the degree to which it evokes a
feeling of dread.
Research has shown that laypeople's risk perceptions andattitudes are closely related
to the position of a hazard within the factor space. Most important is the factor "Dread
Risk." The higher a hazard's score on this factor (i.e., the further to the right it appears in
the space), the higher its perceived risk, the more people want to see its current risks
reduced, and the more they want to see strict regulation employed to achieve the desired
reduction in risk. In contrast, experts' perceptions of risk are not closely related to any of
the various risk characteristics or factors derived from these characteristics. Instead, experts
appear to see riskiness as synonymous with expected annual mortality (Slovic, Fischhoff, &
Lichtenstein, 1979). As a result, many conflicts about "risk" may result from experts and
laypeople having different definitions of the concept. In such cases, expert recitations of
"risk statistics" will do little to change people's attitudes and perceptions.
Perceptions have Impacts
Another direction taken by early work within the psychometric paradigm was to
examine the role of perceptions in determining the degree of impact resulting from the
2 As we shall see, later, smaller, and more homogeneous hazard sets can produce
different spaces
Perception of Risk: Reflections . . . / 10
occurrence of an "unfortunate event" (e.g., an accident, a discovery of pollution, sabotage,
product tampering, etc.).
Risk analyses typically model the impacts of such events in terms of direct harm to
victims-deaths, injuries, and damages. The impacts of an unfortunate event, however,
sometimes extend far beyond these direct harmful effects, and may include indirect costs to
the responsible government agency orprivate company thatfar exceed direct costs. Insome
cases, all companies in an industry are affected, regardless of which company was
responsible for the mishap. In extreme cases, the indirect costs of a mishap may even
extend past industry boundaries, affecting companies, industries, and agencies whose
business isminimally related to the initial event. Thus, an unfortunate event canbe thought
ofas a stone dropped ina pond. The ripples spread outward, encompassing first thedirectly
affected victims, then the responsible company or agency, and, in the extreme, reaching
other companies, agencies, and industries.
Some events make only small ripples; others make big ones. Early theories equated
the magnitude of impact to the number of people killed or injured, or to the amount of
property damaged. However, the accident at the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear reactor
in 1979 provided a dramatic demonstration that factors besides injury, death, and property
damage can impose serious costs. Despite the fact that not a single person died at TMI, and
few ifany latent cancer fatalities are expected, no other accident in our history has produced
such costly societal impacts. Inaddition to its impact on the utility that owned and operated
the plant, this accident also imposed enormous costs on the nuclear industry and on society.
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These came from stricter regulation, reduced operation ofreactors worldwide, greater public
opposition tonuclear power, reliance onmore expensive energy sources, and increased costs
of reactor construction and operation. The point is that traditional economic and risk
analyses tend to neglect these higher-order impacts, hence they greatly underestimate the
costs associated with certain kinds of mishaps.
A conceptual framework aimed at describing how psychological, social, cultural, and
political factors interact to "amplify risk" and produce ripple effects has been presented by
Kasperson, Renn, Slovic et al. (1988). An important element of this framework is the
assumption that the perceived seriousness of an accident or other unfortunate event, the
media coverage it gets, and the long-range costs and other higher-order impacts on the
responsible company, industry, oragency are determined, inpart, by what that event signals
or portends. Signal value reflects the perception that the event provides new information
about the likelihood of similar or more destructive future mishaps (Slovic, Lichtenstein, &
Fischhoff, 1984).
The informativeness or signal potential of an event, and thus its potential social
impact, appears to be systematically related to the characteristics of the hazard and the
location of the event within the factor space (see Figure 3). An accident that takes many
lives may produce relatively little social disturbance (beyond that caused the victims' families
and friends) if it occurs as part of a familiar and well-understood system (e.g., a train
wreck). However, a small accident in an unfamiliar system (or one perceived as poorly
understood), such as a nuclear reactor or a recombinant DNA laboratory, may have
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immense social consequences if it isperceived as a harbinger of further (and possibly catas
trophic) mishaps.
Insert Figure 3 about here
One implication ofthesignal concept isthateffort and expense beyond that indicated
by a cost/benefit analysis might be warranted to reduce the possibility of "high-signal
accidents." Unfortunate events involving hazards in the upper-right quadrant of Figure 2
appear particularly likely to have the potential to produce particularly large ripples. As a
result, risk analyses and risk-management decisions regarding these hazards need to be
sensitive to these possible higher-order impacts.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The pace ofpsychometric research has accelerated in recent years. The early work
has been replicated and extended with new and more interesting kinds of respondents and
with very different sets of hazards and characteristics. Important concepts from other
domains, such as stigma, have been brought to bear upon risk perception and risk-impact
analysis.
New Respondents
Our early studies were limited, by financial constraints, to local populations of
students and citizen groups (League ofWomen Voters; business clubs). In recent years, the
paradigm has been applied internationally, sometimes with local groups and sometimes with
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representative national samples. International studies have contrasted perceptions ofcollege
students in the United States, Hungary (Englander et al., 1986), Norway (Teigen, Brun, &
Slovic, 1988), Hong Kong (Keown, 1989), Japan (Rosa & Kleinhesselink, 1989), Poland
(Goszczynska, Tyszka, &Slovic, inpress) and theSoviet Union (Mechitov &Rebrik, 1990).
Some of the largest discrepancies have been found between American and Hungarian
students. TheHungarians perceived much lower risks from 84 of90 activities. Within each
country, the relative ordering of concerns was also much different. Hungarians saw rela
tively greater risks from hazards in the lower left quadrant of the factor space-railroads,
boating, home appliances, and mushroom hunting, whereas the Americans were relatively
moreconcerned with hazards in the upper-right quadrant pertaining to radiationand chemi
cal technologies. Turning to non-student populations, Gould et al. (1988) studied represen
tative samples of 1320 individuals living in New England and the Southwest United States
in a replication of our earlier studies. Morgan et al. (1985) surveyed 116 alumni of Carne
gie-Mellon University regarding perception of risks from electric and magnetic fields.
Kunreuther, Desvousges, and Slovic conducted a national telephone survey in the United
States, focusing on perceptions of nuclear power and nuclear waste. We have also con
ducted two large psychometric surveys of the general public in Sweden (Slovic, Kraus,
Lappe, Letzel, & Malmfors, 1989) and Canada (Slovic, Kraus, Lappe, & Major, 1989).
Kraus and Slovic (1988) surveyed a large sample ofconsumers in six different regions ofthe
United States, regarding their perceived risks from household products.
Perception of Risk: Reflections . . . / 14
These large-scale studies have produced numerous interesting results, ofwhich I shall
mention only a few. One intriguing finding by Morgan et al. (1985) was that perceived risks
associated with electric and magnetic fields from power lines and electric blankets were
relatively low. However, when the respondents were given a supposedly non-alarming
briefing about research on health effects of fields (which said that many studies had been
done, but no adverse human health effects had yet been reliably demonstrated), their
perceptions on subsequent retest shifted towards greater perceived risk. They also saw risks
of electric fields from transmission lines and electric blankets as less well known, more
dread, more likely to be fatal, less equitable, and less adequately controlled after receiving
this information. Today, as research studying health effects of exposure to electric fields
remains inconclusive but is discussed frequently in the news, perceptions of risk from these
fields is rapidly increasing (Coy, 1989).
A second finding of interest comes from the national surveys we have conducted in
Sweden and Canada. Figure 4shows mean risk/benefit perceptions inCanada for 33 items,
more than half of which pertain to medicines and other medical devices and treatments.
Careful examination of the figure illustrates some findings that have appeared in a number
ofsurveys. Nuclear power, an industrial radiation technology, has very high perceived risk
and low perceived benefit whereas diagnostic x-rays, a medical radiation technology, has the
opposite pattern (relatively low perceived risk, very high perceived benefit). A parallel
finding occurs with chemicals. Non-medical sources of exposure to chemicals (e.g.,
pesticides, food additives, alcohol, cigarettes) are seen as very low benefit and high risk;
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medical chemicals (e.g., prescription drugs, antibiotics, vaccines, vitamins) aregenerally seen
as high benefit and low risk, despite the fact that they can be very toxic substances and
human exposure to them is quite great. The favorable perceptions and acceptance of risks
from x-rays and most medicines suggests that acceptance of risk is conditioned by
perceptions of direct benefits and by trust in the managers of technology, in this case the
medical and pharmaceutical professions. It isalso clear thatthere is no general oruniversal
pattern of perceptions for radiation and chemicals. Further demonstration of this point
comes from studies of radon which, like x-rays, is a hazard of little concern to most people
(Sandman, Weinstein, & Klotz, 1987). In contrast, food irradiation, like nuclear power,
generates enough concern to block the application of that technology. In the domain of
radiation and chemical technologies there appears to be little relationship between the
magnitude of risk assessed by experts (health physicists, epidemiologists, and toxicologists)
and the magnitude of perceived risks. This state of affairs, and the opposition to many
technologies that accompanies it, is a source ofgreat frustration and concern to many (see,
e.g., Whelan, 1985; Wildavsky, 1979). We shall return to this issue later.
Insert Figure 4 about here
Psychometric surveys provide a wealth of quantitative data that permit one to
monitor perceptions over time. In 1987 we replicated a study that we had first conducted
in 1979, using the same population (University ofOregon students). Across the eight-year
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period there was remarkable stability for some items (e.g., non-nuclear electric power,
bicycles, tractors, cosmetics, food preservatives). Some items showed sizable increases in
perceived benefits (e.g., commercial aviation, satellites, microwave ovens, radiation therapy,
heart surgery, lasers) and some showed large decreases in perceived risk (e.g., microwave
ovens, lasers, oral contraceptives). By far the greatest change in perception occurred with
marijuana, whose perceived benefit decreased from a mean of53.3 (on a 100-point scale)
to 21.2 and whose perceived risk increased from 25.4 to 41.0.
The large national surveys have uncovered numerous strong subgroup differences in
perceptions. In Canada, perceptions ofrisk and benefit were strongly related to region of
residence (Quebec, a French culture, stood out), age, sex, education, and degree ofpolitical
activism. The sex differences were quite interesting. Close to two dozen studies have found
that women have higher perceived risk for nuclear power than men (see results from
Sweden inFigure 5). InCanada, women's perceptions ofrisk were equal toorgreater than
men's for every one of the 33 items studied (see Figure 6), and nuclear power was not
exceptional in this regard.
Insert Figures 5 and 6 about here
New Hazard Domains
The earliest psychometric studies were distinguished by their comparisons of large
hazard sets containing items as diverse as bicycles and nuclear power plants. Factor analysis
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of relationships among these items produced what might be called a "global space" asshown
inFigure 2. A question, ofboth theoretical and practical significance, iswhether theglobal
structure would also pertain to a "local" set of hazards, all falling within the same general
category. For example, one point inFigure 2 represents the technology "railroads." But all
railroad hazards may not be the same. Would a taxonomy consisting solely of railroad
hazards have the same factor structure as Figure 2?
To answer this question, Kraus and Slovic (1988) put the railroad point "under a
microscope" to examine its structure. We constructed 49 railroad accident scenarios based
on combinations of the following components:
• Type of train: traditional, high speed, rapid transit
• Type of cargo: passengers, benign cargo (e.g., grain), chemicals
• Type of accident: two-train collision, train-car collision, derailment
• Locationof accident: tunnel, open ground, bridge, grade crossing, mountainpass
• Cause of accident: human error, sabotage, earthquake, mechanical failure.
Each railroad scenario was rated by 50 subjects on perceived riskiness as well as on
10 additional characteristics prominent in previous taxonomies of perceived risk. Several
3Theanswer isnot intuitively obvious. Local and global representations have thesame
dimensions for some objects (e.g., rectangles are always defined by height and width no
matter how similar or dissimilar they are), whereas the dimensions needed to represent
diverse emotions such as love, pride, worry, or anger differ from the local dimensions
needed to characterize the various aspects of a single emotion such as love-puppy love,
maternal love, and so on (Gerrig, Maloney, & Tversky, 1985).
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other hazards, such as nuclear reactors, fire fighting, bicycles, and DNA research were also
rated to help calibrate the railroad data.
Psychometric analysis ofthese data showed considerable similarity between the rail
road space and previous representations based on diverse hazards. The railroad space was
well represented by two factors in which knowledge and catastrophic potential played
defining roles. The results also demonstrated that not all rail hazards are well represented
by the point labeled "railroads" inFigure 2. Atrain carrying explosive chemicals near a city
was perceived to be more like a nuclear reactor than like other rail hazards. A train
carrying non-toxic freight evoked little concern. The heterogeneity ofrailroad hazards has
important practical implications linked with our discussion earlier ofsignal value and impact.
It may be important for policy makers and system designers to know that there are
substantial differences between the degree of concern people show for an ordinary freight
train derailment and the enhanced concern (and social disruption) likely to be associated
with the derailment of a train carrying toxic chemicals. Thus representing railroads as a
single, homogeneous category, may be quite misleading as a predictor of societal response
to specific railroad hazards and accidents.
This latter point was made again in a follow-up study by Slovic, MacGregor, and
Kraus (1987), which examined perceptions ofrisk and signal value for 40 structural defects
in automobiles of the kind that compel manufacturers to initiate a recall campaign. The
defects were diverse, ranging from faulty defrosters to gasoline fumes that enter the pas
senger compartment and problems that reduce the effectiveness of steering or braking
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systems. Each defect was rated on a set of risk-characteristic scales that included overall
vehicle riskiness, manufacturer's ability to anticipate the defect, severity of possible conse
quences, observability, and likelihood that the rater would comply with the recall notice
(bring the car infor repair) if the defect occurred inthe rater's automobile. Afactor analy
sis indicated that these judgments could be summarized in terms of two composite factors,
one representing the possibility ofsevere, uncontrollable damage and the other representing
the foreseeability of the defect by the manufacturer. Within this two-dimensional
representation, the defects were perceived quite differently, as shown inFigure 7. Perceived
risk, rated personal compliance with a recall notice, and actual compliance rates for the
defects were all highly predictable from location within the factor space (R = .89, .81,
and .55, respectively). One defect stood outmuch asnuclear hazards do in Figure 2. It was
a fuel-tank rupture upon impact (labeled FUELRPTR), creating the possibility of fire and
burn injuries. This, of course, is similar to the notorious design problem that plagued the
Ford Pinto and that Ford allegedly declined to correct because a cost-benefit analysis
indicated that the correction costs greatly exceeded the expected benefits from increased
safety (Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company, 1978). Had Ford done a psychometric study, the
analysis might have highlighted this particular defect as one whose seriousness and higher-
order costs (lawsuits, damaged company reputation) were likely tobegreatly underestimated
by their cost-benefit analysis.
Insert Figure 7 about here
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MacGregor and Slovic (1989) subsequently applied a similar analysis to 30
automobile subsystems, including braking, steering, suspension, engine, signaling, electrical,
and fuel systems. Comparisons between perceptions of risk and data on accident causes
showed that drivers appropriately recognized the importance ofbrakes but underestimated
the risks posed by faulty communication and signaling systems such as headlights, brake
lights, marker lights, turn signals, and horn.
Several additional studies have focused on specific classes ofhazards. Representative
samples of the general public in Sweden and Canada rated a hazard set that primarily
consisted of medicines. The two-factor representation resulting from the study in Sweden
is shown in Figure 8. Factor I, which was labeled "Risk," consisted of three scales:
perceived risk, the likelihood of harm, and the seriousness of harm given a mishap. Factor
II, which was called "Warning," consisted of scales measuring newness, knowledge ofrisk,
and degree ofwarning signal, given a mishap. As one goes from left to right in the space,
perceived risk increases. As one goes from the bottom to the top, the items are judged to
have risks that are judged to be newer and less precisely known and a mishap is judged as
providing astronger warning about the possibility that the risk is greater than was previously
believed. Two features of this space stand out. First, all medicines are not alike,
perceptually. Vaccines, antibiotics, and antiarthritic drugs, each of which can have signifi
cant risks, are perceived as rather benign (close to aspirin and laxatives). Anti-depressant
drugs and sleeping pills stand out as the pharmaceutical drugs of greatest concern, a fact
that we have traced to concerns about addiction, abuse, and overdosing. Second, all of the
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medicines cluster near the midpoint of the warning dimension, suggesting a moderate but
not extremely high potential for ripple effects in the event of adverse reactions or other
problems. Of course, under certain conditions, it is clear that medicine failures can have
immense repercussions, as happened with Thalidomide.
Insert Figure 8 about here
Another special domain that we have studied only with college student subjects
(Slovic et al., 1987) consisted of37 LULUS (locally unwanted land uses) and other noxious
environmental features such as smog, crime, air pollution, prisons, earthquake proneness,
chemical and nuclear waste storage facilities, and so on (see Table 1). A large sample of
students rated each of these items on each of seven risk-characteristic scales, resulting in the
factor space shown in Figure 9. It is significant that a nuclear-waste repository (said to be
located 100 miles away) was perceived more negatively across the scales than a nuclear
power plant, a high crime rate, anindustrial waste disposal problem, and most other noxious
features. Perceived personal risk was highly correlated with Factor 1 (r = .72) andwas not
significantly related to Factor 2.
Insert Table 1 and Figure 9 about here
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A study by Benthin, Slovic, and Severson (1988) examined perceptions of risk and
benefit from 30 activities that put young people at risk, including problem behaviors such
as excessive drinking, smoking cigarettes, taking drugs, having unprotected sex, and socially
approved risk taking such asplaying contact sports, skiing, and riding motorcycles. Each of
the 30activities was rated (byhigh school students-mean age 15.5 years) on 14characteris
tics, some taken from our previous risk-perception studies (knowledge of risk, old/new,
perceived risk and benefit, control) and some taken from the literature on adolescent
behavior (perceived peer influence, admiration).4 In addition, the respondents (who were
anonymous) were asked to indicate whether they had participated in these activities during
the pastsix months. The results indicated thatparticipation in risk activities was related to
very distinct cognitive and social perceptions. From a cognitive perspective, young people
who engaged in a risky activity reported greater knowledge of its risks, less fear ofthe risks,
less personal risk, more personal control over risk, less ability to avoid the activity, and
higher participation in the activity by others. From a social viewpoint, participants in risky
activities reported greater peer influence, less desire for regulation of the activity by au
thorities, and greater benefits relative to risks. Of particular interest was the indication in
these data that some highly dangerous activities are also greatly admired. A factor space
was derived from these data. However, as we shall see in the next section, this data set
4The psychometric paradigm is not restricted to the study ofpsychological variables as
the inclusion of these social variables illustrates.
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contains important differences among individuals that can be best analyzed and described
by techniques somewhat different than factor analysis.
New Methods of Analysis
The fact that we seem to learn something new about risk perceptions whenever we
conduct one of these studies does not indicate, however, that our methodology has been
optimal. In a knowledge vacuum, any reasonable empirical study is likely to provide useful
insights. Over the years, a number of methodologically sophisticated researchers have
criticized this work for (a) providing the characteristics of perceived risk to respondents,
rather than letting the respondents provide them (see, e.g., Earle & Lindell, 1984; Perusse,
1980; Vlek & Stallen, 1981); and (b) relying exclusively on principal components factor
analysis to examine the dimensionality ofthedata (Arabie &Maschmeyer, 1988). Vlek and
Stallen (1981) used a "vector model" called PRINCALS (de Leeuw & van Rijckevorsal,
1980) to show that individuals differed in their cognitive representations of hazards, thus
demonstrating that aggregate representations masked important information. Kraus and
Slovic (1988), using a "policy-capturing methodology," also found significant individual
differences in subject's models for perceived risk. Johnson and Tversky (1984) collected
data on hazards in several different ways, permitting them to apply principal components
factor analysis, multidimensional scaling methods, and discrete clustering models to the
results. They found thateach approach provided different perspectives and insights regard
ing the representation of perceived risk.
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Arabie and Maschmeyer (1988) provided an extensive overview and critique of risk
perception methodologies, arguing for greater use of methods permitting individual differ
ences to be represented spatially and greater use of methods based on discrete clustering
models. Specifically, they suggest the use of three-dimensional factor analysis (e.g.,
Kroonenberg, 1983; Tucker, 1964), and multidimensional scaling techniques such as
INDSCAL (Carroll & Chang, 1970) to assess individual differences and the use of models
such as ADDTREE (Sattath & Tversky, 1977) or ADDCLUS (Shepard & Arabie, 1979) to
represent hazards within discrete clusters.
Inlight ofthese criticisms, we and others have begun toreanalyze our data sets, using
some ofthese alternative exploratory multivariate techniques. Easterling (1989) hasrecently
applied the INDSCAL method to our data on adolescent risk perception. INDSCAL
simultaneously creates a spatial mapping ofperceptions and assesses individual differences
with reference to the space. Recall that each high school student rated 30 hazards on 14
characteristics, producing a 14 element profile for each hazard. All pairs ofprofiles (e.g.,
driving a carvs. rock climbing) arecompared and a Euclidian distance measure iscomputed
as a measure of profile similarity for each pair. Analysis of these distance measures by
means of INDSCAL produces a group space of hazards and places each individual subject
within thatspace according to the degree to which he or she weights the dimensions of that
space (as inferred from the profile similarity matrix for each subject). Figure 10 shows the
two major group dimensions that emerged from Easterling's analysis of the adolescent
sample. Dimension 1(horizontal axis) clearly separates the activities, with socially approved
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activities falling toward the high (right-hand) endof the dimension andsocially disapproved
activities falling toward the low (left) end. Dimension 2 (vertical axis) appears to reflect
aspects of peer influence andadmiration, anchored by socially influenced behaviors such as
drinking alcoholic beverages, driving a car, listening to loud music, playing sports, and
sunbathing at the high end ofpeer influence and admiration, and by crash dieting, bulimia,
diet pills, and drug abuse at the low end.
Insert Figure 10 about here
The INDSCAL analysis produces weights for each dimension for each respondent.
Theweights given Dimensions 1 and 2 for each of the 30subjects are plotted in Figure 11.
Each single-digit number in the space represents an individual respondent and the number
indicates the number of different kinds of destructive risk-taking activities that person had
reported engaging in. Each individual is scaled in terms of a vector or arrow emanating
from the origin of the space. The number is located at the tip or endpoint of the vector -
the line is not shown. The position of the tip is determined by the angle of the vector
which, in turn, reflects the relative weight given each of the dimensions. The distance of the
number from the origin reflects the degree to which this model fits the subject's responses.
If both dimensions are of equal importance, then the person's point will fall on a straight
line bisecting the angle (45 degrees) between the dimensions. Individuals below that line
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weight Dimension 1 more heavily and those above the line weight Dimension 2 more
heavily.
Insert Figure 11 about here
The intriguing result shown in Figure 11 is that adolescents who participated in one
or more types ofdestructive risk taking weighted Dimension 2more heavily (and Dimension
1 less heavily) than did non-participants in dangerous activities. The line shown in the
figure is slightly greater than 45 degrees above thehorizontal axis. Prediction based on this
line would correctly classify 27 of the 30 young people as either participants or non-
participants (zero scorers) in destructive risk taking. These results suggest that adolescents
who engage inthedangerous activities located toward theleft-hand side ofFigure 11 do not
perceive a great deal of difference between those activities and the safer activities toward
the right-hand side of the space. In other words, some may find these dangerous activities
acceptable because they are not perceived to be true risks or outliers within the realm of
possible adolescent behaviors. The analysis also indicates that those who engage in
destructive risk taking exaggerate the differences between activities on Dimension 2,
suggesting that they are relatively more sensitive than non-participants to elements ofpeer
influence.
It is important to add that the analysis depicted in Figures 10 and 11 represents
prediction of recent or ongoing behaviors from current perceptions. The challenge for
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future research is to determine, by means of longitudinal studies, whether individual
differences in perceptions develop in advance of engagement in harmful risk taking. If so,
this methodology may be able to depict those perceptions in a way that signals or forecasts
a change in risk-taking behavior.
This INDSCAL analysis indicates that ourprevious studies, relying uponfactor analy
sis ofgroup means, may have missed important individual differences inperceptions. Wider
use of scaling methods that take individual differences into account seems warranted.
New Theories and Conceptual Frameworks
Confirmatory modeling. Psychometric studies of perceived risk have been relatively
theoretical and the methods of data collection and analysis have reflected this orientation.
Principal components factor analysis and INDSCAL, which have been illustrated above,
along with the other methodologies described by Arabie and Maschmeyer (1988), all fall
into the general class of exploratory multivariate methods. The data analysis tends to
precede conceptual analysis. As useful as these methods may be, they do not allow explicit
specification and testing of theory.
We are now at a stage where we can begin to piece together theories and
frameworks. Fortunately, there are analytic methods appropriate for this stage. In
particular, a variety of techniques known as confirmatory multivariate methods have been
developed for the express purpose of theory testing. Examples of methods that fall within
this class are covariance structure analysis (LISREL) andpartialleastsquares (PLS) analysis
(Bentler, 1980; Fornell, 1982).
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In testing theories, confirmatory approaches are ableto analyze multiple criterion and
predictor variables, unobservable theoretical variables, and errors in measurement. In
contrast, many exploratory procedures can address only one or two of these aspects and
none can cope with them all. For example, factor analysis handles unobservable variables
but is not confirmatory. Multiple regression allows for tests of significance regarding
parameter estimates and the regression equation, and thus in a weak sense is confirmatory.
However, such analysis is limited to a single observable criterion variable. In addition,
multiple regression assumes that all explanatory variables have the same status and have a
direct effect on the criterion variable.
Burns et al. (1990) used confirmatory methods to test the theoretical framework that
Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. (1988) developed to explain social impacts of risk events.
This theory, labeled "the social amplification of risk," addresses the fact that the adverse
effects of a risk event sometimes extend far beyond the direct damages to victims, property,
and environment and may result in massive indirect impacts. Models based on analysis of
108 accident events were consistent with the theory in the sense that the social and
economic impacts ofan adverse event were determined not only bythe direct biological and
physical consequences of the event, butby elements ofperceived risk, media coverage, and
signal value. A particularly important signal was the perception that the event was caused
by managerial incompetence.
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New Forms of Risk Impact - Stigma
In 1986 we were afforded the opportunity to workwith an interdisciplinary team of
social scientists in what was the largest social impact assessment project ever attempted.
The task was in some sense an impossible one - to forecast the socialand economic impacts
on residents and communities in Southern Nevada in the event that the nation's high-level
nuclear waste repository was sited, built, and put into operationat Yucca Mountain. Aswe
sought to find some way to approach this daunting task, we came upon the concept of
stigma. As we examined this concept, it became evident that stigmatization is closely
associated with perception of risk.
Goffman (1963) noted that the word stigma was used by the ancient Greeks to refer
to bodily marks or brands that were designed to expose infamy or disgrace ~ for example,
to indicate that the bearer of the mark was a slave or criminal. As it is used today, the
word denotes a victim "marked"as deviant, flawed, limited, spoiled, or generally undesirable
in the view of some observer. When the stigmatizing characteristic is observed, perception
of the victim changes in a negative way. Prime targets for stigmatization are members of
minority groups, the aged, persons afflicted with physical or mental disabilities and
deformities, and behavioral deviants such as criminals, drug addicts, homosexuals, and
alcoholics. Individuals in these categories haveattributes that do not accordwithprevailing
standards of the normal and the good. They are denigrated and avoided.
Jones et al. (1984) attempted to characterize the key dimensions of social stigma.
The six dimensions or factors they proposed were as follows:
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(1) Concealability. Is the condition hidden or obvious? To what extent is its visibility
controllable?
(2) Course. What patternof change over time is usually shown by the condition? What is
its ultimate outcome?
(3) Disruptiveness. Does the condition block or hamper interaction and communication?
(4) Aesthetic qualities. To what extent does the mark make the possessor repellent, ugly,
or upsetting?
(5) Origin. Under what circumstances did thecondition originate? Was anyone responsible
for it, and what was he or she trying to do?
(6) Peril. What kind of danger is posed by the mark and how imminent and serious is it?
Dimension 6, peril, is the key link between stigma and perceived risk, but other
dimensions may also come into play in the stigmatization of hazards. It seems evident that
stigmatization canbe generalized from persons toproducts, technologies, and environments.
For example, nuclear and chemical waste disposal sites may be perceived as repellent, ugly,
and upsetting (Dimension 4) to the extent that they become visible (Dimension 1). Such
waste sites may also be perceived asdisruptive (Dimension 3). They are certainly perceived
as dangerous (Dimension 6).
A stigma resulting from pollution by a toxic substance is described by Edelstein
(1986), who analyzed a case in which a dairy's cows become contaminated with PCBs for
a short period of time. Once this contamination became known (a visible mark) the
reputation of the dairy was discredited and its products became undesirable, even though
the level of PCBs was never sufficiently high to prohibit sale of those products. Edelstein
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shows, step by step, how this incident meets the various criteria of stigmatization put forth
by Jones et al.
Although Edelstein's case of stigma involved dairy products, only a short leap is
required to extend the concept to environments that have been contaminated by toxic
substances (Edelstein, 1988). Times Beach, Missouri, and Love Canal, New York come
quickly to mind.
We have recently been exploring ways to measure environmental stigma. One
method that seems quite promising uses a word-association technique to evoke the imagery,
knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, and affective states associated with specific environments.
Word associations have a long history in psychology, going back to Galton (1880), Wundt
(1883), and Freud (1924). More recently, Szalay and Deese (1978) have employed the
method of continued associations to assess people's subjective representation systems for a
wide range of concepts. This method requires the subject to make repeated associations to
the same stimulus, for example,
war: soldier
war: fight
war: killing
war: etc.
Szalay and Deese argue that this technique is an efficient way of determining the
contents and representational systems of human minds without requiring those contents to
be expressed in the full discursive structure of language. In fact, we may reveal ourselves
through associations in ways we might find difficult to do if we were required to spell out
the full propositions behind these associations through answers to question.
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We conducted a study in which we asked University of Oregon students to produce
continued associations to four states: New Jersey, Nevada, Colorado, and California.
Subjects answered anonymously and without time pressure, to allow full expression of their
thoughts. The results of thisstudy clearly demonstrated environmental stigmatization in the
minds of our sample of Oregon students. The image of New Jersey was dominated by
pollution including toxic waste, filth, and garbage as members of the most common associa
tive category. New Jersey was also seen as overcrowded, ugly, and associated with crime.
Its farms and beaches were very infrequent images. Nevada's imagery was dominated by
its desert landscape along with entertainment, gambling, and prostitution. It is also
becoming associated with things nuclear (fifth most frequent category). Its scenic beauty,
outdoor recreation, and ranches are secondary to these other images. Images of Colorado
and California are far more positive than images of New Jersey and Nevada.
Returning to the issue of Yucca Mountain, weconducted a series of studies using the
method of continued association to document the relationship between images, risk, pref
erences, and economically important behaviors (Slovic, Layman, Kraus, et al., 1989). First
we demonstrated that cities and states had diverse positive and negative images as noted
above. Second, we showed that by rating the degree of positive and negative affective
content and summing these ratings across a person's set of images for each stimulus city or
stimulus state, we could accurately predict a person's expressed preferences for future
vacation sites, places to retire, and places to locate new businesses. Imagery was also
predictive of previous visits to a place. Third, we asked people to associate to the concept
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of an "underground nuclear waste storage facility." The results, shown in Table 2 for a
representative sample of residents in Phoenix, Arizona, could not have been morenegative,
or more representative of a stigmatized environmental facility. Third, we showed that
nuclear imagery had already infiltrated the minds of about 10% of our respondents when
they associated to the state "Nevada." We traced this nuclear imagery to knowledge of the
nuclear weapons test site located near Yucca Mountain. We also found that nuclear
imagery, when present, was associated with much lower preference for Nevada as a place
to vacation.
We concluded that, were development and operation of the Yucca Mountain site to
proceed, any problems associated with the repository would have the potential to link the
repository, things nuclear, and many other highly negative images with the state of Nevada
and the city of Las Vegas. Increased negativity of imagery, aswe had demonstrated, could
possibly lead to serious impacts on tourism, migration, and economic development in the
Southern Nevada region. Through the mechanisms of social amplification, even minor
problems could increase stigmatization, due to heavy media coverage and the attention
drawn to these problems by special interest groups. Although precise specification of the
probability, magnitude, and duration of such impacts is beyond the state of the art in social
science prediction it is clear that such impacts cannot be ignored in decisions about the
siting and management of the repository. TheState of Nevada has cited the findings from
these studies as instrumental in the State's decision to prevent the federal governmentfrom
performing any further investigation of the Yucca Mountain site (Mckay, 1990).
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Insert Table 2 about here
The stigmatization of environments hasseveral important implications for hazardous
waste management in general. First, it implies that, whatever the health risks associated
with waste products, there are likely to be significant social and economic impacts upon
regions perceived as polluted, or as dumps. Second, it also gives additional importance to
managing wastes effectively so that stigmatizing incidents (even ones without significant
health consequences) will not occur.
Just as environments can becomestigmatized by risk problems, so can products (the
IUD, the Pinto) and their manufacturers (A. H. Robbins, Ford Motor Company). Union
Carbide hasundoubtedly become stigmatized because of the Bhopal accident and Exxon as
well as because of the oil spill at Valdez.
Technologies become stigmatized byrisk, too. The image ofmost chemical technolo
gies is so negative that when we asked college students and members of the general public
to tell us what comes to mind when they hear or read the word "chemicals," by far the most
frequent response was "dangerous" or some closely related term (e.g., toxic, hazardous,
poison, deadly); beneficial uses of chemicals were rarely mentioned (see Table 3).
Insert Table 3 about here
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Toward Deeper Levels of Analysis: Intuitive Toxicology
Thepower offactor analysis or multidimensional scaling lies in theirability to synthe
size tens of thousands of judgments into a few visual displays. This broad descriptive
capability carries with it, of necessity, a weakness. The analyses lack depth. They provide
only a surface level of description that leaves many questions unanswered. Why do we not
dread auto accidents? Why have perceptions of marijuana changed so drastically among
college students over the past eight years? Why do adolescents who engage in dangerous
activities believe they cannot avoid doing so but, once engaged in them, believe they can
control the risks? Why are chemical risks of such great concern?
Answers to these sorts of questions require different methods of analysis - methods
which may afford deeper understanding of specific issues, rather than broad, but shallow,
representations.
We have begun to reach for a deeper understanding of perceived risks from
chemicals. Given the importance of chemical technologies in our daily lives, the extreme
negative perceptions of chemical risks held by so many people is nothing short of
astounding. This negativity of perceptions is especially significant in light of the immense
scientific and regulatory efforts that have been designed to reduce public exposure to and
harm from chemicals. Billions of dollars have been spent on risk-assessment studies by
toxicologists and epidemiologists. Massive regulatory bureaucracies have been formed to
oversee the use of these risk assessments for standard setting and risk management.
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Yet despite this enormous effort, people in the U.S. and many other industrialized
nations see themselves as increasingly vulnerable to the risks from chemical technologies
and believe that the worst is yet to come. Regulatory agencies have become embroiled in
rancorous conflicts, caught between a fearful and dissatisfied public on the one side and
frustrated industrialists and technologists on the other. Industry sees an urgent need to
communicate with the public but does not know how to do so.
Nancy Kraus, Torbjora Malmfors, and I have approached this problem from a per
spective that we have labeled "Intuitive Toxicology" (Kraus, Malmfors, & Slovic, 1990).
Humans have always been intuitive toxicologists, relying on their senses of sight, taste, and
smell to detect unsafe food, water, and air. The science of toxicology has been developed
tosupplement and, inmany cases replace, our sensory systems. However, as a report by the
National Academy of Sciences has indicated (National Academy of Sciences, 1983),
toxicological risk assessment itself is inherently subjective, relying heavily upon assumptions
and judgment.
Theobjective ofourcurrent research is to explore thecognitive models, assumptions,
and inference methods that comprise laypeople's "intuitive toxicological theories" and to
compare these theories with the cognitive models, assumptions, and inference methods of
scientific toxicology and risk assessment. We hope that such comparisons will expose the
specific similarities and differences within expert communities as well as the similarities and
differences between lay perceptions and expert views. We also hope that the knowledge
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gained from these comparisons will provide a valuable starting point around which to
structure discussion, education, and communication about toxicological risk assessment.
Wehave begun this effort byidentifying several fundamental principles andjudgmen
tal components within the science of toxicological risk assessment. Questions were de
veloped based on these fundamentals in order to determine the extent to which laypeople
and experts share this same knowledge base and conceptual framework. Our questions
addressed the following topics:
• conceptions of toxicity
• conceptions of the relationship between chemical dose and exposure and risk to
human health
• trust in use of animal and bacterial studies to determine risk to humans
• attitudes towards chemicals and their risks
• interpretation of evidence regarding cause-effect relationships between exposure
to chemicals and human health.
Questions on these topics were incorporated into a single questionnaire, designed for
both experts and the public. This questionnaire asks a series ofquestions about chemicals
and their risks, using an agree/disagree answer format. The term "chemicals" was defined
to include "... all chemical elements and compounds, including pesticides, food additives,
industrial chemicals, household cleaning agents, prescription and nonprescription drugs, etc."
Table 4 presents five of the specific questions used to assess conceptions of toxicity and
beliefs about the link between dose and exposure and possible harm.
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Insert Table 4 about here
The questions were designed, whenever possible, according to a guiding hypothesis
about how experts and "lay toxicologists" might respond. For example, perhaps the most
important principle in toxicology is the fact that "the dose makes the poison" (Ottoboni,
1984). Any substance cancause a toxic effect if the dose isgreatenough. Thus we expected
experts to exhibit considerable sensitivity to consideration of exposure and dose when
responding to the five items in Table 4. In contrast, the concerns of the public regarding
very small exposures or doses ofchemicals ledus to hypothesize that thepublic would have
more of an "all or none" view of toxicity and would be rather insensitive to concentration,
dose, and exposure when responding to the items in Category 1.
The questions in Table 4 comprise a small part of a lengthy survey that we
administered to 180 members of the Society of Toxicology and 262 members of the general
public. The data showed substantial differences in the attitudes and beliefs of experts and
laypeople. Laypeople tended to believe that any exposure to a toxic substance or
carcinogen, no matter how small, was likely to prove harmful. Toxicologists had, as
expected, a much more differentiated sense ofthe relationship between dose and degree of
exposure and harm. Perhaps most important was the divergence of opinion among
toxicologists, themselves, onquestions pertaining tothereliability and validity ofanimal tests
for assessing the risks that chemicals pose for humans. This lack of confidence in the
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science may be a significant cause of the public's anxiety and distrust. We also observed a
strong "affiliation bias" indicating that toxicologists working for industry see chemicals as
more benign than do their counterparts in academia and government. Industrial
toxicologists were somewhat more confident than other experts in the general validity of
animal tests - except when those tests were said to provide evidence for carcinogenicity -
in which case many of the industrial experts changed their opinions that the testswerevalid.
Similar results have been found by Lynn (1987) and, together, these data clearly show the
influence of personal and organizational values on risk assessment.
Detailed assessments of a person's knowledge, attitudes,beliefs, values, perceptions,
and inference mechanisms make up what cognitive psychologists refer to as a "mental
model." Our study of intuitive toxicology attempts to describe the mental models of experts
and laypersons regarding the effects of chemicals on humanhealth. Mental models of risk
from radon and from electric fields are currently being developed at Carnegie-Mellon
University. I expect that thisparadigm will be increasingly reliedupon to describe perceived
risk and to facilitate communication about risk.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Need for a Multidisciplinary Perspective
Although the psychometric approach hasbeen oriented toward cognitive psychology
and behavioral decision theory, I believe that societal response to hazards is
multidetermined and thus needs to be studied in a multidisciplinary way.
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Occasionally one sees attempts to test "rival disciplinary theories" of risk perception,
as though one approach - social, cultural, psychological, or economic ~ could be "the right
way" to conceptualize things (see, e.g., Wildavsky & Dake, 1990). This makes little sense
to me. It is most certainly the case that information processing (cognition), personality,
social factors, economic factors, and cultural factors interact to determine individual and
societal response to risk. The mix may be difficult, if not impossible, to separate ~ witness
the endless debates about nature vs. nurture.
Consider, for example, the quality "dread." Mostpeople in our culturalwould judge
sudden death from heart disease as less dreaded than death from cancer. I am told that in
some eastern cultures the opposite is true - a lingering death from cancer is preferred
because it gives one the opportunity to put one's affairs in order and say goodbye. Thus
dread appears to be both psychological and cultural and it doesnot seemworthwhile to me
to attempt to disentangle these various aspects.
Fortunately, the psychometric approach is not inherently psychological, as shown by
the inclusion of social variables in the study of adolescent risk taking, the inclusion of insti
tutional and economic variables in the social-amplification study, and the inclusion of polit
ical and ideological variables in other studies (Buss, Craik, & Dake, 1986).
Risk Perception and Rationality
Are public perceptions of risk irrational? Many technologists believe that they are.
For example, public perceptions of nuclear power risks have evoked harsh reactions from
experts. One noted psychiatrist wrote that "the irrational fear of nuclear plants isbased on
Perception of Risk: Reflections . . . / 41
a mistaken assessment of the risks" (Dupont, 1981; p. 8). A nuclear physicist and leading
advocate of nuclear power contended that"... the public has been driven insane over fear
of radiation [from nuclear power]. I use the word 'insane' purposefully since one of its
definitions is loss of contact with reality. The public's understanding of radiation dangers
has virtually lost all contact with the actual dangers as understood by scientists (Cohen,
1983).
Risk-perception research paints a different picture, demonstrating that people's deep
anxieties about nuclear powerand itswastes are linkedto numerous realities. For example,
one reality for the public consists of innumerable news stories about poorly sequestered
radioactive wastes from the nation's military reactors contaminating the environment and
threatening human health at Hanford, Savannah River, Rocky Flats, Fernald, Ohio and
other sites. Another reality for the public is witnessing the Department of Energydeclare
that it has no confidence in it's two-year, 500 million dollar attempt to evaluate the safety
of the proposed waste-repository site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (Wald, 1989). Well-
publicized conflicts among scientists about the ability of animal tests to predict human
health effects from chemicals (Associated Press, 1990) form yet another "reality." Thus,
although one may legitimately disagree with public perceptions of risk, they are clearly not
irrational.
More generally, psychometric research demonstrates that, whereas experts define risk
in a narrow, technical way, the public has a richer, more complex view, that incorporates
value-laden considerations such as equity, catastrophic potential, and controllability. The
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issue is not whether these are legitimate, rational considerations, but how to integrate them
into risk analyses and policy decisions.
Risk Perception and Risk Analysis
Risk-perception studies indicate that public views about risky technologies need to
be taken seriously. The problem is that it is not obvious how to incorporate public
perceptions and preferences into risk analysis and decision making. A risk manager who
wants to include public perceptions will probably not know how to do so.
Some risk analysts have attempted to provide guidance about how to weigh and
combine social and technical considerations. For example, Starr (1969) distinguished
between voluntary and involuntary activities in assessing risk-benefit balances and Wilson
(1975) and Griesemeyer and Okrent (1981) proposed that large accidents needed to be
given proportionally more weight than numerous small accidents totaling the same amount
of damage. Rowe (1977) and Litai, Lanning, and Rasmussen (1983) have explored the
possibility of adjusting risk estimates to take into account the importance of various risk-
perception characteristics; however, their work treats highly interdependent characteristics
as though they were independent, thus their analyses are prone to serious "double counting"
effects. Fischhoff, Watson, and Hope (1984) have suggested that multi-attribute utility
theory be employed to insure that social and psychological factors are incorporated into
technical and economic analyses. To my knowledge, none of these various proposals have
been developed to the point of application in actual risk analyses.
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I know of only one method of risk analysis that has formally integrated technical,
economic, and social (perception) factors in a formal way and done so in real applications.
This approach has been developed by two Swiss analysts to aid decisions about the safety
of ammunition storage depots and transportation systems, including the design of the pro
posed high-speed railway in Germany (Bohnenblust & Schneider, 1984). The method is
essentially a cost-effectiveness approach that allocates more money for risk reduction to
hazards that are involuntary, poorly understood, and hard to control. Although this "Swiss
model" has been successfully applied in a number of important decision problems, there is
a need to align the model more closely with the research that has been done on risk per
ception and its impacts (e.g., signals, ripples, social amplification). A recent effort in this
direction hasbeen initiated byBurns (1990). Moregenerally, there is need for research that
determines how the public feels about incorporating risk-perception characteristics as
explicit criteria that are traded against cost and more traditional criteria (e.g., lives and
health effects).
Risk Perception and Trust
As I contemplate the current problems most in need of research, the issue of trust
leaps to the top of the list. Themassive discrepancies between expert risk assessments and
public perceptions and the acrimonious conflicts over risk-management issues can be seen
as reflecting a "crisis in confidence," a profound breakdown of trust in the scientific,
governmental, and industrial managers of radiation and chemical technologies. There is a
great need to understand the nature of trust in order to develop social and institutional
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processes for decision making that restore and maintain this vital but fragile quality. Many
different methods of analysis can contribute such knowledge but, considering the
multidimensional nature of trust (ethics, intentions, competence, . . . ) it appears to be a
natural candidate for the psychometric paradigm.
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Table 1
Environmental features studied by Slovic et al., 1987
1. Heavy Smog 20. Large Dam
2. Heavy Traffic 21. Sewage Treatment Plant
3. High Crime Rate 22. Recombinant DNA Laboratory
4. Industrial Waste Disposal Problem 23. A Main Route for Transport of LNG
5. Severe Water Problem 24. Active Volcano (100 miles away)
6. Nuclear Power Plant 25. Large Prison Facility
7. Nuclear Waste Storage Site
(100 miles away)
26. Institution for the Crimi
nally Insane
8. Earthquake-Prone Area 27. Coal-Fired Power Plant
9. Hurricane/Tornado-Prone Area 28. Hydro-Electric Power Plant
10. Acid Rain 29. Overpopulation/Overcrowding
11. Strip Mining 30. Water Shortages
12. High Levels of Radon Gas 31. Chemical Manufacturing Plant
13. Heavy Use of Pesticides 32. High Noise Level
14. Heavy Use of Herbicides to
Control Weed and Grass Growth
33. High Alcohol Consumption Rate
15. Asbestos-Insulated Buildings 34. Legalized Gambling
16. Plutonium Plant 35. Legalized Prostitution
17. A Main Route for Transporting 36. Ku Klux Klan Headquarters
High-Level Radioactive Waste
18. MiUtary Weapons Manufacturing
Fatility
19. Extensive Landfills
37. Nuclear Weapons Test Site
(100 miles away)
Table 2
Hierarchy ofImages Associated with an "Underground Nuclear Waste Storage Fatility"
Category
1. Dangerous
2. Death
3. Negative
4. Pollution
5. War
6. Radiation
7. Scary
8. Somewhere Else
9. Unnecessary
10. Problems
11. Desert
12. Non-Nevada Locations
13. Storage Location
14. Government/Industry
Frequency Images Included in Category
179 dangerous, danger, hazardous, toxic, unsafe,
harmful, disaster
107 death, sickness, dying, destruction
99 negative,wrong, bad, unpleasant, terrible,
gross, undesirable, awful, dislike, ugly,
horrible
97 pollution, contamination, leakage, spiUs, Love
Canal
62 war, bombs, nuclear war, holocaust
59 radiation, nuclear, radioactive, glowing
55 scary, frightening, concern, worried, fear,
horror
49 wouldn't want to Uve near one, not where I
live, far away as possible
44 unnecessary, bad idea, waste of land
39 problems, trouble
37 desert, barren, desolate
35 Utah, Arizona, Denver
32 caverns, underground salt mine
23 government, poUtics, big business
Table 3
CoUege students' word associations to the stimulus term "Chemicals"
Dangerous
Chemical Names
and Elements
Pollution
Laboratory
Chemical Types
Chemistry
Useful
Wastes
Food
"Paraphanelia"
Burn
DOW
War
Technology
Frequency
59
45
29
30
21
16
14
10
9
11
12
6
11
7
Toxic, Hazardous, Deadly, Destruction, Accidents,
Poisonous, Explosive, KiU, Harmful, Bhopal, Cancer,
Bad, Noxious
H2SO4, Ozone, Carbon, Dioxin, Gas, DDT, Cyanide,
Methane, Hydrogen, Monoxide, Oxygen, Uranium,
Acid '
Love Canal, Greenhouse Effect, SmeUy, Teledyne
Wah Chang, Air Pollution
Experiments, Science
Herbicides, Pesticides, Preservatives, Vitamins, Ferti
lizer, Drugs, Medicines
Beneficial, Jobs, Benefits, Valuable, Products, Help
ful
Beaker, Bottles, Flasks, Litmus, Test Tubes, Hood,
Stockroom
Burner, Bunsen-Burner, Burning
Warfare
Industry
Table 4
QuestionsDesigned to Assess Sensitivity to Degree of Exposure
If you are exposed to a toxic chemical substance, then you are likely to suffer adverse
health effects.
If youare exposed to a carcinogen, then youare likely to get cancer.
Forpesticides, it'snothow much of thechemical you are exposed to that should worry
you, but whetheror not you are exposed to it at all.
A chemical was found in a city's supply of drinking waterin a concentration of 30parts
per nullion. Because scientists believed that there might beharmful effects from this
level of exposure to the chemical, thewater was filtered by a process thatwas able to
reduce, but not eliminate, the chemical concentration in the water. Under most
circumstances this means that the dangerassociated withdrinking the water has also
been reduced.
There is no safe level of exposure to a cancer-causing agent.
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FIGURE CAPTIONS
Figure 1. Profiles for nuclear power and x-rays across nine riskcharacteristics. Source:
Fischhoff et al. (1978).
Figure 2. Location of 82 hazards of Factors 1 and 2 derived from the interrelationships
among fifteen risk characteristics. Each factor is made up of a combination of characteristics,
as indicated by the lower diagram. Source: Slovic (1987).
Figure 3. Relation between signal potential and riskcharacterization for 30hazards from
Figure 2. The larger the point, the greater the degree to which an accident involving that hazard
was judged to "serve as a warning signal for society, providing new information about the
probabUity that simUar or even more destructive mishaps might occur within this type of
activity." The higher-order costs of a mishap are Ukely to be correlated with signal potential.
Source: Slovic, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff (1984).
Figure 4. Mean perceived risk and perceived benefit for 33 activities, substances, and
technologies based on a national survey in Canada. Source: Slovic, Kraus, Lappe, and Major
(1989).
Figure 5. Risk perceptions of Swedish men and women. Source: Slovic, Kraus, Lappe,
Letzel, and Malmfors (1989).
Figure 6. Risk perception of Canadian men and women. Source: Slovic, Kraus, Lappe,
and Major (1989).
Figure 7. Location of 40 automobUe defects within a two-factor space derived from
interrelationships among five characteristics. Source: Slovic, MacGregor, and Kraus (1987).
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Figure 8. Perceptual map of pharmaceutical products, medical treatments, and other
hazards in the Swedish study. Source: Slovic, Kraus, Lappe, Letzel, and Malmfors (1989).
Figure 9. Spatial representation of perceptions among 37 unwanted environmental
features. Source: Slovic et al. (1987).
Figure 10. Hazard space derived from INDSCAL Analysis. Source: EasterUng (1989).
Figure 11. Subject weights for dimensions in the group hazard space. Each number
represents a respondent, coded according to the number of destructive risk-taking activities that
a person participated in. Source: EasterUng (1989).
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Figure3. Relation between signal potential and risk characterization for 30 hazards from
Figure 2. The larger thepoint, the greater thedegree to which an accident involving that hazard
was judged to "serve as a warning signal for society, providing new information about the
probability that similar or even more destructive mishaps might occur within this type of
activity." The higher-order costs of a mishap are likely to be correlated with signal potential.
Source: Slovic, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff (1984).
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